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In Scott, the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed its

decision in Vilardi to depart from the United States Supreme
Court's decision to apply a single standard in all cases. New
York law, thus, continues to afford defendants greater protection
than Federal law by using the less stringent standard for
determining the materiality of favorable evidence under its Due
Process Clause.
126

Pringle v. Wolfe
(decided June 28, 1996)
The plaintiff, Michael Pringle, was arrested and charged with
driving while intoxicated. 12 7 The plaintiff brought this action

for a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of

12 8
the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1193 (2)(e)(7),
12 9
commonly referred to as the "prompt suspension law."
Pringle asserted this statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution 13 0 and article I, section 6 of the
New York State1 3 1 Constitution. 13 2 The challenged statute

required "that a driver who is charged with driving while

126. 88 N.Y.2d 426, 668 N.E.2d 1376, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1996).
127. Id. at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
128. N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 1193(2)(e)(7) (McKinney 1996). Section
1193(2)(e)(7) provides in pertinent part: Suspension pending prosecution;
excessive blood alcohol content. (a) A court shall suspend a driver's license,
pending prosecution, of any person ... alleged to have had . 10 of one percent
or more by weight of alcohol in such driver's blood ....
Id.
129. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 429-30, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d
at 85.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part:

"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law." Id.
131. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Id.
132. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 430, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d at

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1997], Art. 17

770

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

' 133
The
intoxicated have his/her driver's license suspended."
court determined no due process violation in light of the fact that
the statute provides the driver with notice that a "license
suspension hearing [would] be held before the conclusion of all
"...,,134
Since the code allows the driver to
proceedings .
present evidence at the suspension hearing to challenge the
court's findings or to show that such a suspension would cause
extreme hardship, the court held that the Vehicle and Traffic Law
affords all process constitutionally due. 135
The federal constitutional standard for determining "what
process is due to protect against the risk of erroneous
deprivation" was summarized in Mathews v. Eldridge.136 The
Mathews Court explained that "due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." 137 The Court articulated a three factor balancing test
to be considered when determining whether a statute is within the
138
constitutionally protected area of due process:

[Fjirst, [whether or not] the private interest ...

will be affected

by official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if
any, of additional procedural [or substitute] sateguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the [function
involved and the] fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedur[al] [requirement] would
9
entail. 13
With regard to the first factor, private interest being affected,
140
the Pringle court analogized this case to Mackey v. Montrym.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1380, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
Id.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, there

was a challenge to the constitutionality of the procedures used in terminating
Social Security disability benefits pending a later hearing. Id. at 321.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 335.
140. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 431, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85,
See Mackey v. Montrym 443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Mackey, there was a challenge
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In Mackey, as in the present case, the statute required the
"suspension of a driver's license [for refusing] to take a breathanalysis test upon arrest for driving while under the influence of
".."141
The Mackey Court upheld the
intoxicating liquor ..
statute as constitutional because of post-suspension hearings
immediately available to the suspended driver and that the
14 2
suspension could only be for a maximum of ninety days.
Since the prompt suspension law allows for: (1) a pre-suspension
hearing, 143(2) a "mandatory suspension period of 30 days" 144 and
(3) an immediate hardship relief upon the suspension of the
license, 145 the Pringlecourt reasoned that, just as in Mackey, the
"severity of the prompt suspension law is tempered." 146
With regard to the second factor, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, the court again relied on Mackey. 147 In Mackey,
the Court explained that "the Due Process Clause simply does
not mandate that all government decision making comply with
standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations." 148 The
Court also noted that, on the issue of what process is due, that
"something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action." 149 Hence, the Pringle court
determined that there was no constitutional violation because the
statute does not allow the court to order the suspension of a
driver's license "unless it has in its possession the documented
to the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that mandated that a driver's
license be suspended for refusing to take a breath-analysis test after being
arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 3.
141. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 3.

142. Id. at 12. In Mackey, the Court stated that "Itihe District Court's
failure to consider the relative length of the suspension periods involved in...
the case at bar, as well as the relative timeliness of the post-suspension review
available to a suspended driver, was erroneous." Id.
143. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 431, 668 N.E.2d at 1378-79, 646 N.Y.S.2d at
85.
144. Id. at 433, 668 N.E.2d at 1380, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 431, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
Id. at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1380, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13.
Id. (quoting Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977)).
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results of a reliable chemical test ....
,,150 Further, the court
determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation is diminished,
because the driver has a pre-suspension opportunity to challenge
15 1
the chemical test results.
With regard to the last factor, the importance of the State's
interest, the court adopted the view presented in Mackey where
"the states are 'accorded . . . great leeway in adopting summary
procedures to protect public health and safety.' 152 The court
concluded that requiring additional procedural protection "would
subvert the State's compelling interest in promoting highway
safety." 153 The court further stated that "[t]he summary and
automatic character of the suspension sanction available under the
15 4
statute is critical to attainment of its objectives."
Accordingly, the prompt suspension law was found to be
consistent with both the United States and New York
Constitutions. 155 The driver's right to a hearing before a license
is suspended affords the driver all, if not more than, the process
that is constitutionally due under both the New York and Federal
Constitutions. 156 The federal courts as well as the New York
State courts analyze "what process is due" in a consistent
fashion. 157

150. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 86.;
see also People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 148, 497 N.E.2d 657, 663, 506
N.Y.S.2d 290, 296-97 (1986) (stating that a "chemical analysis . . . made by
an individual possessing a permit issued by the Department of Health is
'presumptive evidence' that the examination was properly given").
151. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 430, 432, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at
85; see also Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 1118 (1983) (explaining
that when a statute "provides for a predeprivation hearing abundantly weigh[ ]
... in favor of the constitutionality of the implied-consent scheme").
152. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 434, 668 N.E.2d at 1381, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 87
(quoting Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17).
153. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 434, 668 N.E.2d at 1381, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
154. Id. (quoting Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18).
155. Pringle, 88 N.Y.2d at 434, 668 N.E.2d at 1381, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
156. Id.

157. Id. at 431, 668 N.E.2d at 1379, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 85.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/17

4

